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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**Routing Slip**

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SUSPENSE		2 November Date			

Remarks:

Please prepare brief
acknowledgment for DCI's signature.

Executive Secretary
29 October 1981
Date

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State Dept. review completed

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

Rec'd 29 Oct
Executive Registry
81-5482

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 26, 1981

Dear Bill,

You won't find much new in the enclosed garland, but there may be something there for you. In any event, I believe in keeping you informed!

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Casey

Enclosures:

1. Memo on Trip to Europe
2. New York Speeches

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director of CIA

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reflections on My Trip to Brussels, SHAPE, Bonn,
and London, September 24, to October 13, 1981

The idea of the trip started with a request from the German Ambassador here that I go to Bonn as soon as possible to address German public anxieties about the complex of issues associated with nuclear arms control. As it developed, my program was about equally divided among three activities related to TNF and START: talking with ministers and officials of NATO and the host governments, and with General Rogers and his chief colleagues at SHAPE; discussing the problems with local experts; and speeches, press conferences, and interviews with journalists. In addition I spent as much time as possible with the staffs of our own Embassies, an activity I always find worthwhile. In England I also met with Michael Foot, the present leader of the Labor Party, and with David Owen, the former Labor Foreign Minister who is now one of the leaders in the new Social Democratic Party. In Germany, I met with a large number of parliamentarians of both parties. All in all, I made at least eight speeches, conducted innumerable governmental and political conversations, and met with media representatives, singly and in groups, at least twelve times.

I am convinced by my experience that on these enormously sensitive issues we must supplement our regular NATO consultations both in Washington and in the NATO capitals, and extend the process, though less intensively, to Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Israel, and perhaps China and a few other countries as well. All the senior people I talked to fully agree.

I am relatively optimistic about the capacity of the German and British governments to withstand the stress of the moment, provided we do the necessary in leading opinion, and do it well. The trouble is

2.

largely -- though not entirely -- within the parties of the Left. They are divided, as our Democratic Party is divided, by a set of issues associated with attitudes towards the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons, pacificism, and so on. (There are even a few doves within the Republican Party, after all.) If Schmidt should lose out in the SPD in Germany, there is an even stronger governing coalition available, consisting of the CDU-CSU group plus a large fraction of the SPD. Most Germans know very well that this is not the time to capitulate to the Soviet Union, which is cracking badly in Poland and elsewhere.

We face a long turbulent period on the nuclear arms control front. The Soviet Union is making arms control a major theme in its propaganda effort to split us from our allies and other friends and to prevent Western rearmament. It will take a big and well planned campaign to hold the line, and if possible come out with stronger alliances than we have now, especially if we cannot reach agreement with the Soviet Union. I am optimistic about our chances for success in this effort, but it will not be easy.

I by no means exclude the possibility that in the end, and despite their military lead, the Soviet Union will decide to go along with us in an agreement based on our principle of equal nuclear deterrence: that is, an agreement which would permit us to deny them the capacity to deter our deterrent, split our alliances, and keep on expanding indefinitely in the Third World and the First World too. The troubles of the Soviets in Poland are so serious and so far-reaching that if they really are the rational chess players we like to think they are, they will choose a period of stability in their relations with the United States, probably after a couple of years of sparring to see if they can bamboozle us into accepting the equivalent of another SALT II.

Of course, the dilemma of the Soviet Union in Poland, along with its economic and social troubles, by no means guarantees a happy ending. If the Russians really were rational chess players, they never would

3.

have started down the imperial road, where would-be conquerors always wind up the same way. Instead, they would have followed the peaceful example of the Germans and Japanese, making money -- not war.

Several issues emerged sharply in the course of my trip.

First, public opinion in Northern Europe, except for France, (like public opinion in the United States, Canada, and Australia and New Zealand) has an exaggerated faith in the contribution arms control agreements can make to peace. Because Europe is on the front line of possible war and has only begun -- reluctantly -- to acknowledge the nature of Soviet policy, the sense of agitation there is more advanced than it is in the United States. The Europeans are clamoring for negotiation with the Soviets and blaming us for the absence of negotiation. Most of the leaders of opinion in Europe are afraid of this clamor -- afraid to challenge it, afraid it will become so strong as to overwhelm policy. The situation in this respect reminds me of American opinion about Vietnam in 1965 or 1966. At that time, the anti-Vietnam opinion was significant and growing but was not yet a tidal wave. It could still have been managed by the right combination of words and actions.

The same forces which are at work in Europe are at work here: the churches, the education and civic groups, the world affairs councils, and so on. We are not handling them well, and they are becoming more and more unhappy with us. Everything I say about the state of public opinion in Europe applies to our domestic problems, but not yet so violently.

Of course, many of the people -- both here and in Europe -- who are urging us to "negotiate" with the Soviet Union are really urging us to accept agreements on Soviet terms.

The heart of our problem is to persuade the large majority of Americans and Europeans that we must not do that, but insist on an approach which is fair, reasonable, and balanced. If the Soviets accept our approach, which

must rest on the principle of mutual deterrence, fine. But if they insist on a treaty which would authorize them to build and consolidate a position of coercive supremacy, we must not only say "No" but convince our own and allied public opinion that we were right to do so, i.e., that the absence of an agreement is their fault, not ours.

The argument I used in Europe -- so far it seems to have worked pretty well -- focussed on the American strategic guaranty. For years after 1945, I said, Europe was protected against Soviet conventional force superiority by American nuclear superiority. After 1970, the nuclear balance began to change, and we started to retreat. The Europeans became worried. They wondered whether the nuclear umbrella was leaking. Henry Kissinger made his appalling speech in Brussels, announcing that "great powers never commit suicide for their allies." Schmidt spoke in London, asking us to do something about the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. The result was the two-track decision of 1979 -- an all-NATO decision of European parentage, not an American decision imposed on Europe. We accepted it, but it was not our policy in the first place. The reason for deciding to place Pershings and GLCMs on the ground in Europe is the same as the reason for keeping American conventional forces in Europe -- to make the American strategic nuclear guaranty credible, especially in the USSR. The best TNF agreement in the world could not achieve European immunity from nuclear threat. In order to back the Pershings and the GLCMs, we are modernizing our strategic nuclear arsenal, and restoring its deterrent strength.

In my expositions in Europe, I explained that SALT II would have forced "decoupling" Europe from the US strategic guaranty by making it impossible for us to restore the balance, thus paralyzing our second strike capability.

Secondly, we must convince public opinion in Europe that we are serious about arms control. I was startled to hear this thesis echoed even in the North Atlantic Council, where one Ambassador after another said I had helped to dissipate doubts about our

5.

"sincerity" in pursuing arms control agreements. Many Europeans do doubt our sincerity, and suspect we are stalling until we are rearmed, and will then plunge the world into nuclear war. It is not impossible or even very difficult to deal with these absurd claims, which the Soviet Union is exploiting effectively. But we must do it, and not leave the field to the Soviets by default.

On basic approaches to the negotiating process, there is now nominal agreement between the United States and the allies, and the consultative machinery is working well. I believe the governments now see that we must stick to the two-track NATO decision and that any modification of it would seem like retreat under Soviet pressure. But on a good many lesser issues agreement is only skin deep. If the negotiating process is prolonged -- and we must plan on the assumption that it will be prolonged -- I suspect we will be under pressure from our allies before long not to insist "too much" on verification, on balance, and on a great many other issues. The Germans are very keen for a formula which would permit the Soviets to cut their SS-20s enough so that we would not have to deploy Pershings and GLCMs at all, although they also know that it is a fantasy to suppose that the Soviet Union would abandon its huge investment in these new mobile weapons.

In short, the state of opinion in Europe is one of fear which could lead to appeasement. We are not far behind in the United States, although American opinion is not yet quite so agitated.

The moral, I believe, is that our statements must be clear and calm, and should address each of the main issues in turn: (1) what can arms control contribute to the search for peace? (2) the differences between the Soviet and American doctrines about the use of nuclear weapons and therefore about arms control; (3) what an arms control agreement based on the American principle of equal deterrence requires, given the failures of the last ten years and the size and rate of

6.

growth of the Soviet arsenal and its link to the use by the Soviet Union of conventional forces, terrorism, subversion, and the like; and (4) the strategy and tactics of negotiating such an agreement, and maintaining full Allied support while we do so.

Eugene V. Rostow

Eugene V. Rostow

October 16, 1981